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BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, AND STATE AUTHORITY
James C. Ho *
Chairman Swinford, Chairman King, and distinguished mem-
bers:
It is an honor to appear before this important joint committee
hearing today to examine the issue of birthright citizenship and
House Bill 28' by Representative Berman.2
The topic of immigration and border security generates consid-
erable heat and passion. Many Texans feel strongly that America
is a nation of immigrants. Many other Texans feel just as strongly
that America is, first and foremost, a nation of laws. As both an
immigrant and a lawyer, I have a great deal of respect for both
sides.
But I am not here to speak about my personal views. Nor am I
here to speak on behalf of any particular community or interest
group-although I am certainly grateful that the ACLU of Texas
has arranged for me to be here today.
* Of Counsel, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Dallas, Texas. J.D., 1999, University
of Chicago School of Law; B.A., 1995, Stanford University. The author is of counsel in the
Dallas office and Appellate and Constitutional Law practice group of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP. He previously served as chief counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Sub-
committees on the Constitution and Immigration, as an attorney in the Office of Legal
Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice, and as a law clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas.
This article is adapted from testimony delivered at a joint hearing of the Committee on
State Affairs and the Committee on Border and International Affairs of the Texas House
of Representatives on March 28, 2007. For a more comprehensive analysis, see James C.
Ho, Defining "American": Birthright Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the
14th Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 367 (2006).
1. H.R. 28, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).
2. Since this hearing, similar laws have been proposed in the form of ballot initia-
tives for the 2008 elections in California and Arizona. See Amy Taxin, Initiative Gnaws at
Citizenship, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Santa Ana, Cal.), Nov. 18, 2007, at 17 (California);
Yvonne Wingett, Ballot Proposal Reins in Birthright Citizenship, ARIz. REPUBLIC (Phoe-
nix), Dec. 7, 2007, at 3 (Arizona). The same legal analysis applies to those proposals.
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Instead, I am here as an attorney who has devoted most of his
career to counseling government officials and private sector cli-
ents alike about the United States Constitution and the legality
of various laws and government actions. I am honored to appear
here today to discuss the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
birthright citizenship.'
Generations of Americans have come to understand that chil-
dren born in the United States are entitled to U.S. citizenship,
regardless of the nationality of their parents. House Bill 28 at-
tempts to effectively do away with birthright citizenship for the
U.S.-born children of illegal aliens and undocumented persons
here in the great state of Texas.4
Let me state at the outset: I have no doubt that Representative
Berman's policy views are heartfelt and sincere. Nor do I doubt
that many people feel strongly that there is a connection between
birthright citizenship and illegal immigration.
But there are many topics of discussion that may be otherwise
legitimate, but are nevertheless restricted by the United States
Constitution. Examples range widely from campaign finance laws
that effectively restrict political speech in violation of the First
Amendment,5 to the rule that only thirty-five year olds and natu-
ral born citizens may serve as President.' Reasonable people may
disagree on the merits of such policies, yet there is no question
that the U.S. Constitution imposes important limits on them.
The U.S. Constitution speaks directly to the issue of birthright
citizenship.7 It makes clear that birthright citizenship is a matter
of constitutional right, no less for the U.S.-born children of unlaw-
ful aliens and undocumented persons than for the descendants of
passengers of the Mayflower. I reach this conclusion based on the
text of the Constitution, common law history, legislative history,
and U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. H.R. 28, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).
5. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (examining cam-
paign finance reform in light of First Amendment concerns).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see also James C. Ho, President Schwarzenegger--Or
At Least Hughes?, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 105 (2004).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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We begin-as we always should-with the text of the Constitu-
tion. The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . .. ."'
The motivating purpose of this amendment was to overturn the
notorious U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott.9 But the
amendment was drafted broadly to guarantee citizenship to vir-
tually everyone born in the United States. 10
The critical language of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."11 Proponents of re-
pealing birthright citizenship argue that this language excludes
all non-citizens-both lawful and unlawful-because "subject to
jurisdiction" means allegiance. 2 They point out that non-citizens
don't swear allegiance to the United States; they swear allegiance
to their home country. 13
Respectfully, I don't think that that is a reasonable reading of
the text. I would submit that the plain meaning of "subject to ju-
risdiction" is rather straightforward. It simply means that one
must have a duty to obey U.S. law. When a person is "subject to
the jurisdiction" of a court of law, that person is required to obey
the orders of that court. When a company is "subject to the juris-
diction" of a government agency, that company is required to obey
the regulations promulgated by that agency. The meaning of the
phrase is simple: One is "subject to the jurisdiction" of another
whenever one is obliged to obey the laws of another. 4 Simply put,
the test is obedience, not allegiance.
It is also worth observing that if the drafters had intended to
require allegiance, rather than obedience, they could have said so.
How easy it would have been for them to state explicitly that only
8. Id.
9. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873) (citing Scott v.
Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)) (stating that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United
States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States").
10. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898); see also The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Born in the U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright Citizenship
in the Wake of 9/11, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 955, 957-58 (2008).
13. See id. at 115-17.
14. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 160-61 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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children born to citizens are guaranteed birthright citizenship-
with a simple proviso to address the descendants of slaves. But
instead, they chose the language of jurisdiction, not citizenship.
And that decision deserves respect.
Of course, the phrase "subject to jurisdiction" must mean some-
thing. Otherwise, it would serve no purpose.15 Under the inter-
pretation I put forth, it does serve a purpose. The "jurisdiction"
requirement excludes only those individuals who are not required
to obey U.S. law. This concept-like much of early U.S. law-
derives from English common law. Under the common law, nei-
ther foreign diplomats nor enemy soldiers are legally required to
obey our law. They enjoy diplomatic immunity or combatant im-
munity from our laws.16 As a result, their U.S.-born offspring are
not entitled to birthright citizenship.
This understanding is also confirmed by the Congressional de-
bates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. Members of the
39th Congress debated the wisdom of guaranteeing birthright
citizenship, but no one disputed the amendment's meaning.17 In
fact, opponents of the amendment conceded-indeed, they
warned-that the language of the Citizenship Clause would
guarantee citizenship to the children of those who owe the U.S.
no allegiance. And supporters of the amendment agreed that only
members of Indian tribes, ambassadors, foreign ministers, and
others who are not "subject to our laws" would fall outside the
guarantee of birthright citizenship.
This interpretation is further confirmed by U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.'" In 1898, the Court held in United States v. Wong
Kim Ark that a U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrants was consti-
15. Cf. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) ("[T]he Court will avoid a
reading [of a statute] which renders some words altogether redundant.") (citing United
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
16. See Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 1984)
(diplomatic immunity); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(combatant immunity).
17. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2892-97 (1866) (debating ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
18. This interpretation has also been affirmed by the Executive Branch under Presi-
dents of both parties, including Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. See, e.g., Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (No. 80-1538), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2363 (President Reagan); 19 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 340, 341-42 (1995) (President Clinton).
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tutionally entitled to citizenship. 9 The Court noted that "[tlhe
Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental
rule of citizenship by birth within the territory . .. including all
children here born of resident aliens."2 °
The Court has since reiterated this view in subsequent deci-
sions, applying this principle specifically to the children of un-
documented persons. In Plyler v. Doe, a majority of justices con-
cluded-and all four dissenting justices agreed-that birthright
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment "extends to anyone
... who is subject to the laws of a State," including the U.S.-born
children of "illegal aliens."21 And in INS v. Rios-Pineda, the Court
unanimously observed that a child born to an undocumented im-
migrant was in fact a citizen of the United States.22
I will close by acknowledging that House Bill 28 does not di-
rectly repeal birthright citizenship,23 as some bills in Congress
would do. 24 It simply provides that U.S.-born children of undocu-
mented persons are denied all state and local government ser-
vices. 25 But that approach, if anything, makes House Bill 28 less
constitutional, not more constitutional. Supporters of House Bill
28 acknowledge that the legislation is intended as an indirect at-
tack on birthright citizenship. But citizenship laws are dictated
by Congress, not by the states, under Article I of the Constitu-
tion.26 As a result, states are forbidden from engaging in across-
the-board discrimination against individuals on the basis of their
nationality, except as authorized by Congress. In this sense,
House Bill 28 is even more difficult to justify-because it dis-
criminates against U.S. citizens based on the nationality of their
parents.
19. See 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
20. Id. at 693.
21. 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982); id. at 243 (Burger, J., dissenting).
22. 471 U.S. 444, 445, 446 (1985).
23. See H.R. 28, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).
24. See, e.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2007, H.R. 1940, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007); Reducing Immigration to a Genuinely Healthy Total (RIGHT) Act of 2005, H.R.
3700, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
25. H.R. 28, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
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